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Abstract ― This article presents a framework within which the effects of demographic 
change on both agglomeration and growth of economic activities can be analyzed. I 
introduce an overlapping generation structure into a New Economic Geography model 
with endogenous growth due to learning spillovers and focus on the effects of 
demographic structures on long-run equilibrium outcomes and stability properties. 
First, life-time uncertainty is shown to decrease long-run economic growth 
perspectives. In doing so, it also mitigates the pro-growth effects of agglomeration 
resulting from the localized nature of learning externalities. Second, the turnover of 
generations acts as a dispersion force whose anti-agglomerative effects are, however, 
dampened by the growth-linked circular causality being present as long as interregional 
knowledge spillovers are not perfect. Finally, lifetime uncertainty also reduces the 
possibility that agglomeration is the result of a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
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1 Introduction
Recently, there has been wide interest in the “economics” of population
aging (see e.g. The Economist (2009)). Demographic change has crucial
consequences for economic behavior and development along various dimen-
sions, ranging from such diverse aspects as the determination of aggregate
labor productivity levels to retirement issues. In particular, it highlights that
consumption decisions and incentives to invest in future growth prospects
vary over the life-cycle. The latter has important implications for long-run
economic growth perspectives. The former, on the other hand, should be
decisive for the location of economic activity if one takes into account the
mutual dependence between the spatial distribution of production and de-
mand developments as emphasized in the New Economic Geography (NEG)
literature (see e.g. Baldwin et al. (2003) for an overview). Both growth
and agglomeration processes are, however, themselves interlinked. It is thus
necessary not only to investigate the isolated effects of age-dependent het-
erogeneity on these two issues but to also consider whether and how lifetime
uncertainty impacts upon the linkage between growth and the spatial dis-
tribution of economic activity.
The relationship between growth and agglomeration processes has been
studied extensively in recent years. By claiming that “agglomeration can be
thought as the territorial counterpart of economic growth” Fujita and Thisse
(2002) emphasize that the emergence of concentration of economic activity
is traditionally associated with modern economic growth. The positive link
between growth and spatial agglomeration is mainly attributed to the fact
that technological spillovers, being the engines of endogenous growth, are lo-
calized. Consequently, being close to innovation clusters should have positive
effects on productivity and growth perspectives. Such considerations have
led to the development of integrated frameworks that combine (endogenous)
growth features with NEG models to study the joint process of creation and
location of economic activity (see e.g. Martin and Ottaviano (1999), Martin
and Ottaviano (2001), Baldwin and Forslid (2000) or Baldwin et al. (2001)).
By introducing endogenous capital in his constructed capital model Bald-
win (1999) was the first one allowing for growth features in a NEG frame-
work. The absence of capital mobility in his exogenous growth model im-
plies a demand-linked circular causality fostering agglomeration. Higher
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capital accumulation increases income and expenditures in the respective
region which raises capital rental rates further and thus fosters capital ac-
cumulation even more. Baldwin et al. (2001) extended this framework by
additionally allowing for learning externalities in the capital creation sector.
In their endogenous two-region growth model both the above demand-linked
agglomeration force and a growth-linked circular causality strengthen con-
centration of economic activity. The latter crucially depends on the localized
nature of spillovers. As long as spillovers are not fully globalized, spatial
concentration of capital in one region implies a lower cost of capital creation
and thus speeds up accumulation relative to the other region. Growth itself
can thus lead to catastrophic agglomeration of economic activity. Moreover,
with localized learning spillovers, agglomeration also affects long-run growth
perspectives. In particular, spatial agglomeration is conducive for growth
since it decreases costs in the capital accumulation sector.
The traditional line of investigation of all these NEG approaches to
growth focuses, however, on the joint consequences of increased economic
integration on growth and agglomeration processes while ignoring any po-
tential effect of demographic change. In particular, despite the fact that all
these models are intrinsically dynamic, the impact of an economy’s demo-
graphic structure, and in particular of life-cycle decisions, on consumption
and saving patterns, which themselves play a crucial role for agglomeration
forces, is completely ignored. Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009)
have clearly revealed that this limited perspective misses important mech-
anism that are fundamental for the location of productive factors. They
show that incorporating an overlapping generation structure and lifetime
uncertainty into the constructed capital of Baldwin (1999) introduces an
additional dispersion force that considerably reduces the possibility of ag-
glomeration processes. Prettner (2009), on the other hand, provides evi-
dence for a positive effect of life expectancy on long-run economic growth in
an endogenous growth framework in the spirit of Romer (1990).
This paper merges both strands of analysis by generalizing Baldwin et al.
(2001)’s NEG model with learning spillovers to allow for an overlapping
generation structure with individuals that face a positive probability of death
and differ with respect to age. In doing so, the main emphasis is twofold.
First, the impact of lifetime uncertainty on long-run growth perspectives
is investigated with a view to evaluating the pro-growth effect of spatial
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concentration in a setting accounting for demographic structures. Second,
the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium with respect to varying
mortality rates are analyzed. Here, attention is also paid to the impact of
lifetime uncertainty on history-versus-expectations considerations.1
What I show is that, consistent with Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Pret-
tner (2009), the turnover of generations acts as a dispersion force that damp-
ens the pro-agglomerative growth-linked circular causality being present as
long as interregional learning spillovers are not fully perfect. Moreover, the
model reveals that lifetime uncertainty has important implications for equi-
librium selection. An increase in the mortality rate reduces the possibility
that expectations rather than history, represented by initial conditions, are
decisive with respect to the question in which region agglomeration might
take place. Finally, comparing the negative effect of lifetime uncertainty
on equilibrium growth rates in the symmetric and core-periphery outcome,
shows that, in sharp contrast to existing NEG growth models with localized
knowledge spillovers, spatial agglomeration is not necessarily conducive to
growth in a setting accounting for demographic structures.
The remainder of this paper is structured into four sections. The fol-
lowing section 2 presents the model framework and derives the dynamic
system describing the evolution of the economy. Section 3 characterizes the
long-run equilibria and investigates the impact of lifetime uncertainty on
equilibrium growth rates. The joint effect of demography and spillovers on
the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium is analyzed in section
4, which also focuses on the role of mortality for history-versus-expectations
considerations. Finally, section 5 contains concluding remarks and indicates
further lines of research.
2 The model
This section describes how a notion of learning as in Baldwin et al. (2001) can
be integrated into the generalized constructed capital model of Grafeneder-
Weissteiner and Prettner (2009) to arrive at a NEG framework featuring
both endogenous growth and demographic change.
1This debate was initiated by Krugman (1991b) and deals with the question of equilib-
rium selection in a setting with multiple equilibria (see Baldwin (2001) for a nice overview).
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2.1 Basic structure and underlying assumptions
Consider a world economy with two symmetric regions or countries, denoted
by H for home and F for foreign2, with identical production technologies,
trade costs, preferences of individuals, labor endowments and demographic
structures. Each region has three economic sectors (agriculture, manufac-
turing and investment) with two immobile factors (labor L and capital K)
at their disposal.
2.1.1 Technology
The homogeneous agricultural good, z, is produced in a perfectly compet-
itive market under constant returns to scale using labor as the only input
with, by choice of units, an input coefficient of one. It can be traded between
the two regions without any cost.
Manufacturing firms are modeled as in the monopolistic competition
framework of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and thus supply horizontally differ-
entiated varieties, m. A continuum of varieties i ∈ (0, VH(t)] is produced at
home, whereas a continuum of varieties j ∈ (0, VF (t)] is manufactured in the
foreign region. In contrast to the agricultural good, trade of manufactures
involves iceberg transport costs such that ϕ ≥ 1 units of the differentiated
good have to be shipped in order to sell one unit abroad (see e.g. Baldwin
et al. (2003)). Each variety is produced with one unit of capital as fixed
input and labor as the variable production factor where am represents the
unit input coefficient for efficiency units of labor. Firms thus face an increas-
ing returns to scale production technology with an associated cost function
pi(t) + w(t)amYm(i, t), where pi(t) is the capital rental rate representing the
fixed cost, w(t) is the wage per efficiency unit of labor and Ym(i, t) is total
output of one manufacturing good producer.
In the perfectly competitive investment (or innovation) sector, capital
is produced using labor as the only input with an input coefficient of ai(t).
Capital is viewed here as new knowledge embedded in an interregionally
immobile manufacturing facility. Wages in this sector are being paid out of
2If further distinction is needed, foreign variables are moreover indicated by an asterisk.
In particular, the superscript F denotes that a good was produced in the foreign region,
whereas the asterisk indicates that it is consumed in the foreign region. In what follows,
emphasis will be on the home region. The corresponding expressions for the foreign region
can be derived by symmetry.
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the individuals’ savings. To endogenize long-run growth in this framework, a
sector-wide learning curve is modeled by assuming that the marginal cost of
producing new capital, G(t) ≡ ai(t)w(t), declines as the sector’s cumulative
output rises.3 Specifically,
ai(t) =
1
K(t) + ηK∗(t)
, (1)
where K(t) and K∗(t) is the home respectively foreign capital stock and
0 ≤ η ≤ 1 determines the degree of internationalization of learning effects4
with η = 0 denoting purely localized knowledge spillovers and η = 1 corre-
sponding to the case of global learning effects. As long as η < 1, the costs
of producing new capital units in each region thus depend on the interre-
gional distribution of capital. The foreign technology is isomorphic with
a∗i (t) =
1
K∗(t)+ηK(t) . Following Romer (1990), there is no capital deprecia-
tion.
2.1.2 Demographic structure and preferences
As far as the demographic structure of our model economy is concerned,
this paper closely follows Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009) by
adopting Blanchard (1985)’s overlapping generation framework. At each
point in time, τ ∈ [0,∞), a large cohort consisting of new individuals is
born. These newborns receive no bequests and thus start their lives without
any wealth. The size of this cohort is N(τ, τ) = µN(τ), where µ > 0 is
the constant birth rate and N(τ) ≡ ∫ τ−∞N(t0, τ)dt0 is total population at
time τ with N(t0, τ) denoting the size of the cohort born at t0 for any given
point in time τ .5 Consequently, cohorts can be distinguished by the birth
date t0 of their members. Since there is no heterogeneity between members
of the same cohort, each cohort can be described by one representative
individual, who inelastically supplies his efficiency units of labor on the
3Romer (1990) e.g. rationalizes this assumption by referring to the non-rival nature of
knowledge.
4New capital units can be thus viewed as having two distinct components. On the
one hand, a new capital unit represents private knowledge of how to produce a new
variety, which can be sold in the form of a patent to a manufacturing firm. In this sense
capital is interregionally immobile. On the other hand, however, it also contains public
knowledge since it makes it easier to produce further capital units (imperfectly mobile
spillover component).
5In what follows the first time index of a variable will refer to the birth date, whereas
the second will indicate a certain point in time.
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labor market with perfect mobility across sectors but immobility between
regions. Each individual faces lifetime uncertainty, i.e. its time of death is
stochastic with an exponential probability density function. In particular,
the instantaneous probability of death of each individual is also given by the
age independent parameter µ. This implies that population size is constant
and can be normalized to one.6 Finally, as in Yaari (1965), a perfect life-
insurance company offers actuarial notes, which can be bought or sold by
each individual and are canceled upon the individual’s death.
The overlapping generation structure implies that the overall economy
does not feature one single representative individual. It is thus necessary to
aggregate over the cohorts to arrive at aggregate variables, e.g. aggregate
capital stock of the economy at a certain point in time t is defined as
K(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
k(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0, (2)
where k(t0, t) represents the individual capital stock.
Preferences over the agricultural good and a CES composite of the manu-
facturing varieties are Cobb-Douglas. In particular, expected lifetime utility
of a representative individual of cohort t0 at time t07 is given by
U(t0, t0) =
∫ ∞
t0
e−(ρ+µ)(τ−t0) ln
[
(cz(t0, τ))1−ξ(caggm (t0, τ))
ξ
]
dτ, (3)
where ρ > 0 is the pure rate of time preference, 0 < ξ < 1 is the manufac-
turing share of consumption and
caggm (t0, τ) ≡
[∫ VH(τ)
0
(
cHm(i, t0, τ)
)σ−1
σ di+
∫ VF (τ)
0
(
cFm(j, t0, τ)
)σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
represents consumption of the CES composite with σ > 1 denoting the
6From now on, we will refer to µ as the mortality rate. Note, however, that µ equiva-
lently represents the birth rate, e.g. demographic change as captured by variations in µ
means that both the mortality and the birth rate change by the same amount such that
population size remains constant. This also implies that we restrict attention to changes
in the population age structure (lower µ implies population aging) while neglecting varia-
tions in the population growth rate due to demographic change. In particular, emphasis is
put on comparing a situation that fully ignores demographic structures, i.e. where µ = 0,
to one that allows for them by considering nonzero mortality rates.
7Equation (3) can be easily derived by calculating expected lifetime utility where the
date of death is a random variable with an exponential probability density function pa-
rameterized by a constant instantaneous mortality rate µ.
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elasticity of substitution between varieties.
2.1.3 Capital accumulation
As outlined in section 2.1.1, individual savings, defined as income minus con-
sumption expenditures, are converted into capital in the investment sector.
The wealth constraint of a representative individual can thus be written as
k˙(t0, τ) =
w(τ)l + pi(τ)k(t0, τ)− e(t0, τ)
G(τ)
+ µk(t0, τ), (4)
where l refers to the efficiency units of labor an individual supplies and
e(t0, τ) are individual total expenditures for consumption defined as
e(t0, τ) ≡ pz(τ)cz(t0, τ) +
∫ VH(τ)
0
pHm(i, τ)c
H
m(i, t0, τ)di+∫ VF (τ)
0
pFm,ϕ(j, τ)c
F
m(j, t0, τ)dj.
Here pz(τ) is the price of the agricultural good, pHm(i, τ) the price of a manu-
factured variety produced at home and pFm,ϕ(j, τ) the price of a manufactured
variety produced abroad with the subscript ϕ indicating the dependence on
transport costs.
The particular law of motion for capital given in equation (4) is based on
Yaari (1965)’s full insurance result implying that all individuals only hold
their wealth in the form of actuarial notes, i.e. each individual itself first
converts its savings into capital and then leaves it to the insurance company.
Therefore, the market rate of return on capital, pi(τ)G(τ) , has to be augmented
by µ to obtain the fair rate on actuarial notes (see Yaari (1965)).
Using the demographic assumptions described in section 2.1.2 to substi-
tute out N(t0, t) in equation (2), then differentiating with respect to t and
substituting for k˙(t0, t) from equation (4) and for ai(t) from equation (1)
yields the aggregate law of motion of capital8
K˙(t) = [pi(t)K(t) + w(t)L− E(t)] K(t) + ηK
∗(t)
w(t)
, (5)
where aggregate consumption expenditures, E(t), are analogously defined
8For details of the aggregation procedure see Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner
(2009).
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to the aggregate capital stock in equation (2).9 As outlined in Grafeneder-
Weissteiner and Prettner (2009), the aggregate capital accumulation equa-
tion does not feature the mortality rate µ anymore. This is in sharp contrast
to the law of motion for individual capital and captures the fact that µK(t)
does not represent aggregate capital accumulation but is a transfer - via the
life insurance company - from individuals who died to those who survived.
Similarly, the corresponding law of motion for the foreign capital stock is
given by10
K˙∗(t) = [pi∗(t)K∗(t) + w∗(t)L− E∗(t)] K
∗(t) + ηK(t)
w∗(t)
. (6)
2.2 Short-run equilibrium
Analogously to Baldwin et al. (2001), consumers maximize utility, firms
maximize profits and all goods and factor markets clear for given levels of
K(t) and K(t)∗ in the short-run equilibrium.
2.2.1 Utility maximization
The representative individual of cohort t0 chooses at each instant τ > t0
consumption of the agricultural good, cz(t0, τ), consumption of varieties pro-
duced at home, cHm(i, t0, τ), and consumption of varieties produced abroad,
cFm(j, t0, τ) to maximize expected lifetime utility given in equation (3) sub-
ject to the wealth constraint (4). This optimization problem can be solved
by applying a three stage procedure.11 In the first stage the dynamic saving-
consumption decision is analyzed which yields the individual Euler equation
e˙(t0, τ)
e(t0, τ)
=
pi(τ)
G(τ)
− ρ+ G˙(τ)
G(τ)
. (7)
Note that to each individual the labor input coefficient ai(τ) and thus the
marginal cost of investment in new capital units, G(τ) ≡ ai(τ)w(τ), is a
parameter. This means that the saving decision’s impact on the aggregate
capital stock and thus on ai(τ) is not taken into account, i.e. no internal-
ization of the knowledge spillover takes place.
9The aggregate efficiency units of labor L are equal to the individual supply l since
population size is normalized to one.
10Note that L = L∗ due to symmetry between regions.
11For details see again Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009).
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To arrive at the law of motion for aggregate consumption expenditures
E(t) it is necessary to again “sum” over all cohorts.12 This yields the “ag-
gregate Euler equation” of the economy
E˙(t)
E(t)
= −µ(ρ+ µ)G(t)K(t)
E(t)
+
e˙(t0, t)
e(t0, t)
, (8)
where individual expenditure growth, e˙(t0,τ)e(t0,τ) , is given in equation (7). As
described in detail in Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009), the dif-
ference between individual and aggregate savings behavior is captured by a
correction term representing the distributional effects due to the turnover
of generations. In particular, aggregate expenditure growth falls short of
individual growth as wealthy old individuals with high expenditure levels
are continually replaced by newborns with no capital holdings and thus low
expenditure levels. Analogously, the corresponding law of motion for the
foreign region is given by13
E˙∗(t)
E∗(t)
= −µ(ρ+ µ)G∗(t)K
∗(t)
E∗(t)
+
e˙∗(t0, t)
e∗(t0, t)
. (9)
Stage two and three of the individual optimization problem finally deal
with the static consumption allocation between the CES composite and
the agricultural good as well as the allocation of consumption to each of
the manufactured varieties. Altogether this leads to the following demand
functions for the agricultural good and for each of the manufactured varieties
cz(t0, τ) =
(1− ξ)e(t0, τ)
pz(τ)
, (10)
cHm(i, t0, τ) =
ξe(t0, τ)(pHm(i, τ))
−σ[∫ VH(τ)
0 (p
H
m(i, τ))1−σdi+
∫ VF (τ)
0 (p
F
m,ϕ(j, τ))1−σdj
] ,(11)
cFm(j, t0, τ) =
ξe(t0, τ)(pFm,ϕ(j, τ))
−σ[∫ VH(τ)
0 (p
H
m(i, τ))1−σdi+
∫ VF (τ)
0 (p
F
m,ϕ(j, τ))1−σdj
] .(12)
2.2.2 Profit maximization
Marginal cost pricing in the perfectly competitive agricultural sector and
perfect labor mobility across sectors implies that the equilibrium wage rate
12For details see again Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009).
13Note that µ = µ∗ and ρ = ρ∗ due to symmetry between regions.
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in the economy is pinned down by the price of the agricultural good. As
free trade between home and foreign equalizes this price, wages also equalize
between the two regions as long as each of them produces some agricultural
output which will be assumed from now on.14 Finally, choosing the agricul-
tural good as numeraire leads to
w(t) = w∗(t) = 1. (13)
Manufacturing firm’s profit maximization yields the familiar rule that
prices are equal to a constant markup over marginal costs15
pHm(i, t) =
σ
σ − 1w(t)am, (14)
pFm,ϕ(i, t) = p
H
m(i, t)ϕ. (15)
Mill pricing is optimal, i.e. the only difference between prices in the two
regions is due to transport costs (see e.g. Baldwin et al. (2003)).
Free entry into the manufacturing sector drives pure profits down to zero
which implies that the capital rental rate must equal the operating profit of
each manufacturing firm. Using optimal prices given in equations (14) and
(15) together with equations (11) and (12) and redefining global quantities
and regional share variables16 gives operating profits and thus capital rental
rates as17
pi = Bias
(
ξEW
σKW
)
; Bias ≡
(
θE
θK + φ(1− θK) +
(1− θE)φ
φθK + 1− θK
)
,(16)
pi∗ = Bias∗
(
ξEW
σKW
)
; Bias∗ ≡
(
1− θE
1− θK + φθK +
θEφ
φ(1− θK) + θK
)
,
(17)
where φ ≡ ϕ1−σ is a measure of openness between the two regions with
φ = 0 indicating prohibitive trade barriers and φ = 1 free trade. World
expenditures are defined as EW ≡ E + E∗ and the world capital stock as
14See Baldwin (1999) for details on this assumption.
15For details of the derivations see again Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009).
16In particular, note that the number of varieties in the home region VH(t) is equal to
the capital stock at home K(t) as one variety exactly requires one unit of capital as fixed
input (analogously K∗(t) ≡ VF (t)).
17Time arguments are ignored from now on. Note, moreover, that ξ = ξ∗ and σ = σ∗ due
to symmetry between regions. For further details of the derivations see again Grafeneder-
Weissteiner and Prettner (2009).
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KW ≡ K + K∗ with θK and θE being the respective home shares of these
quantities, i.e. θK ≡ KKW and θE ≡ EEW . The terms labeled Bias and Bias∗
can be interpreted as the bias in national sales, i.e. Bias measures the extent
to which a home variety’s sales (σpi) differ from the world average sales per
variety ( ξE
W
KW
).
2.2.3 The evolution of the economy
Combining the intermediate results of sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 yields a system
of three differential equations in E, E∗ and θK that fully describes the
evolution of the economy. By substituting for ai from equation (1) and for
K˙ and K˙∗ from equations (5) and (6) and by imposing the equilibrium wage
rate from equation (13) as well as the capital rental rates from equations
(16) and (17), the aggregate Euler equations given in (8) and (9) can be
rewritten as
E˙
E
= −µ(ρ+ µ) θK
AE
− (1 + ηA
∗
A
)L+ (E + η
A∗
A
E∗)− ρ
+
ξ
σ
(E + E∗)
[
(A− θK)Bias− ηA
∗
A
(1− θK)Bias∗
]
, (18)
E˙∗
E∗
= −µ(ρ+ µ)1− θK
A∗E∗
− (1 + η A
A∗
)L+ (E∗ + η
A
A∗
E)− ρ
+
ξ
σ
(E + E∗)
[
(A∗ − (1− θK))Bias∗ − η A
A∗
θKBias
]
, (19)
where A ≡ θK + η(1− θK) such that ai = 1KWA and analogously for A∗.
The law of motion of θK is obtained by differentiating the definition of
this share variable with respect to time and then substituting for K˙ and K˙∗
from equations (5) and (6) which yields
θ˙K = θK(1− θK)
(
K˙
K
− K˙
∗
K∗
)
= (1− θK)A[L+ σ
ξ
(E + E∗)θKBias− E]
−θKA∗[L+ σ
ξ
(E + E∗)(1− θK)Bias∗ − E∗], (20)
where again the equilibrium wage rate from equation (13) as well as the
capital rental rate from equation (16) is imposed.
The remaining sections 3 and 4 will analyze this three-dimensional dy-
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namic system (18), (19) and (20) more thoroughly to identify the channels
via which the demographic parameter µ impacts upon both the steady-state
growth rates and the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium. Sim-
ilarly to Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009), the incorporation of
overlapping generations and lifetime uncertainty affects the system only via
the turnover correction terms in the aggregate Euler equations. This already
emphasizes the central role the generational turnover will play for the rela-
tionship between demographic change and agglomeration tendencies. Note,
moreover, that setting µ = 0, i.e. considering the case of an infinitely lived
representative agent, yields the laws of motion obtained by Baldwin et al.
(2001). The framework developed in this paper thus nests their model,
which fully ignores demographic structures, as a special case.
3 Long-run equilibrium
A long-run equilibrium is characterized by the steady-state values E¯, E¯∗ and
θ¯K for which E˙ = E˙∗ = ˙θK = 0. Due to the nonlinearities arising from the
turnover term in the aggregate Euler equations, one cannot solve for all equi-
libria analytically. Numerical investigations, however, reveal an equilibrium
pattern similar to Baldwin et al. (2001). Before presenting these results,
subsection 3.1 analytically characterizes the symmetric interior equilibrium
as well as the core-periphery outcome.18
3.1 Lifetime uncertainty in the symmetric and core-periphery
equilibrium - Is agglomeration pro-growth?
Inserting the symmetric outcome with θK = 0.5 and E = E∗ into the
three-dimensional system reveals that it is indeed a steady state with the
equilibrium level of expenditures given by19
E¯sym = E¯∗sym =
L(1 + η) + ρ+
√
(L(1 + η)+ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)
2(1 + η)
(21)
18These and most other results were derived with Mathematica. The corresponding files
are available from the author upon request.
19Solving the system for the symmetric equilibrium value of expenditures in fact yielded
two solutions. Attention is restricted to the economically meaningful one.
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Equation (21) clearly shows that aggregate expenditures in the symmet-
ric equilibrium increase in the mortality rate. This is fully consistent with
Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009), who, however, could show the
positive dependence in their framework without spillovers only numerically.20
The above finding moreover indicates that the mortality rate influences con-
sumption expenditures primarily via its effect on discounting, i.e. a higher
mortality rate increases expenditure levels of individuals. This “discount
channel” dominates the “age structure based channel”. The latter captures
the effect of the mortality rate on the age composition of the population
and implies a negative dependence since a higher mortality rate increases
the proportion of poor and young individuals with low expenditure levels to
wealthy and old individuals with higher expenditure levels (see Grafeneder-
Weissteiner and Prettner (2009) for details).
The growth rate, defined as g ≡ K˙K , in the symmetric equilibrium can be
obtained from equation (5) by using the equilibrium level of expenditures of
equation (21) and simplifying. It is given by
g¯sym = g¯∗sym = (1 + η)[L−
σ − ξ
σ
E¯sym]
= (1 + η)L− (σ − ξ)
2σ
[L(1 + η) + ρ+
√
(L(1 + η)+ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)].
(22)
Investigating the dependence of this growth rate on the mortality rate im-
mediately yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium growth rate in the symmetric equilibrium
decreases in the mortality rate.
Proof. The derivative of the growth rate with respect to mortality is
∂g¯sym
∂µ
= − (σ − ξ)(2µ+ ρ)
σ
√
(L(1 + η)+ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)
< 0,
since σ > ξ.
This finding is fully consistent with Prettner (2009), who investigates
the consequences of varying mortality rates for growth perspectives in a
20Surprisingly, the introduction of endogenous growth into their framework substantially
simplifies the dynamic system describing the evolution of the economy and thus allows for
more analytical results.
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one-region endogenous growth model in the spirit of Romer (1990). The
negative effect of the mortality rate on the growth rate works via the in-
creased level of equilibrium expenditures (see equation (21)). If individuals
face lifetime uncertainty, available resources are more heavily used for cur-
rent consumption purposes than for investment in capital and thus new
varieties. This is due to the fact that future is discounted more strongly and
thus investment in future growth prospects becomes less important.
Similar findings also apply to the core-periphery outcome.21 First, for a
threshold value of the mortality rate of
µcp =
−ρ+
√(
(L+ρ)(σ−ξ(φη−1))+2Lξ(1− η
φ
)
σ+ξ(φη−1)
)2
− (L2 + 2Lρ)
2
(23)
accumulation of capital in only one region, i.e. θK = 1, can be shown to be a
steady state of the three-dimensional system22 with associated expenditure
levels
E¯cp =
(L+ ρ) +
√
(L+ ρ)2 + 4µ(ρ+ µ)
2
, E¯∗cp = L. (24)
Whereas equilibrium expenditures at home again increase in the mortality
rate, the foreign expenditure level is of course independent of the mortality
rate since, even with infinitely lived individuals, all available resources are
immediately used for consumption purposes. The growth rate in the core-
periphery equilibrium is finally obtained by combining equation (5) with the
core-periphery expenditure levels of (24) which yields
g¯cp =
σ + ξ
σ
L− σ − ξ
σ
E¯cp
=
(3ξ + σ)L− (σ − ξ)(ρ+√(L+ ρ)2 + 4µ(ρ+ µ))
2σ
. (25)
Analogously to the symmetric equilibrium, the impact of lifetime uncer-
tainty on this growth rate can be immediately summarized in the following
proposition.
21Here only the θK = 1 case is considered. Using symmetry between the regions,
analogous results can be shown to hold for θK = 0.
22Following Baldwin et al. (2001), who investigate the equilibria of the model for varying
trade cost levels instead of mortality rates, one can thus conclude that for all µ ≤ µcp
the core-periphery outcome θK = 1 represents a long-run equilibrium. This follows from
taking into account the boundary condition 0 ≤ θK ≤ 1.
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Proposition 2. The equilibrium growth rate in the core-periphery equilib-
rium decreases in the mortality rate.
Proof. The derivative of the growth rate with respect to mortality is
∂g¯cp
∂µ
= − (σ − ξ)(2µ+ ρ)
σ
√
(L+ ρ)2 + 4µ(ρ+ µ)
< 0,
since σ > ξ.
As in the symmetric equilibrium, a positive mortality rate decreases
the equilibrium growth rate via its positive impact upon equilibrium home
expenditures.
Although the mortality rate has the same qualitative effect on the growth
rates in the symmetric and core-periphery equilibrium, its quantitative im-
pact differs. This has crucial implications for the growth rate differential
between the symmetric and the core-periphery equilibrium.23 Baldwin et al.
(2001) show that in their model with infinitely lived individuals the core-
periphery growth rate exceeds the growth rate in the symmetric equilibrium
as long as spillovers are localized, i.e. η < 1. In the case of global spillovers
the growth rates equalize which is intuitive since there is no spillover gain
from agglomeration of innovative activity. Agglomeration is thus pro-growth
unless interregional learning externalities are perfect. Surprisingly, the intro-
duction of overlapping generation structures and lifetime uncertainty qual-
ifies this finding. In particular, for the case of global spillovers, i.e. η = 1,
the growth rate differential is given by
g¯cp − g¯sym|η=1 = σ − ξ2σ
√
(2L+ ρ)2 + 4µ(ρ+ µ)− L
−σ − ξ
2σ
√
(L+ ρ)2 + 4µ(ρ+ µ). (26)
It is easily verified that g¯cp − g¯sym|η=1 for µ = 0 and that this differential
decreases in the mortality rate. Consequently, with lifetime uncertainty,
the core-periphery outcome even features a smaller growth rate than the
symmetric equilibrium for the case of fully globalized spillovers. The growth
advantage of the symmetric equilibrium resulting from the possibility of
23Note that in both equilibria steady-state growth in real income is equalized across
regions. This is due to the fact that real income growth is driven by the steady decrease
in the price index along the growth path which itself results from the growing number of
worldwide varieties KW (see Baldwin et al. (2001)).
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Figure 1: The growth rate differential g¯cp − g¯sym for varying µ and η
death is, however, dampened the more spillovers are localized. This follows
from noting that the growth rate in the symmetric equilibrium is smaller
the more spillovers are localized, i.e. the lower is η, whereas the rate in the
core-periphery outcome is independent of the spillover parameter. Figure
1 illustrates these findings by plotting the level curves of the growth rate
differential g¯cp− g¯sym for varying mortality rates and degrees of interregional
spillovers given the parameter values ρ = 0.015, ξ = 0.3, σ = 4, L = 1.
In sharp contrast to standard NEG growth models (see e.g. Baldwin and
Martin (2004) for an overview), figure 1 nicely shows that even in the case
of localized spillovers the symmetric equilibrium’s growth rate can exceed
the core-periphery’s one, e.g. for η = 0.9, mortality rates above 0.127 would
imply a negative differential. These observations are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3. The growth rate differential g¯cp−g¯sym decreases in the mor-
tality rate with the decrease being dampened the more spillovers are localized.
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Proof.
∂(g¯cp − g¯sym)
∂µ
=
(σ − ξ)(2µ+ ρ)
σ
×
×
(
1√
(L(1 + η) + ρ)2 + 4µ(ρ+ µ)
− 1√
(L+ ρ)2 + 4µ(ρ+ µ)
)
≤ 0,
since η ≥ 0 makes the term in brackets nonpositive and σ > ξ. Clearly,
the above derivative decreases in η which proves the second part of the
proposition.
In a setting with lifetime uncertainty, spatial agglomeration is thus not
necessarily conducive to growth. The intuition for this result becomes clear
when looking more thoroughly at the impact of lifetime uncertainty on the
growth rates in the symmetric and core-periphery outcome. In general, when
spillovers are localized, agglomeration of innovative activity makes innova-
tion cheaper and thus results in higher growth rates. A positive mortality
rate, however, countervails this pro-growth effect of spatial agglomeration.
In particular, it has a less negative effect on the growth rate in the sym-
metric equilibrium than in the core-periphery equilibrium if spillovers are
not purely local. This can be easily seen by comparing the derivatives of
the growth rates with respect to the mortality rate in the proofs of proposi-
tions 1 and 2 which, as the proof of proposition 3 also shows, only equalize
for η = 0. Intuitively, in the symmetric equilibrium with some knowledge
spillovers from the other region, the decrease in saving incentives due to a
higher mortality rate is not as unfavorable for the economy’s growth rate as
in the core-periphery equilibrium with full concentration of innovative activ-
ity. The reason is that spillovers from the other region increase productivity
in the innovation sector such that it is ceteris paribus more attractive to
use resources for investment purposes than for current consumption. Since
this effect is, however, only present in the symmetric equilibrium, a positive
mortality rate decreases equilibrium expenditures less in the symmetric than
in the core-periphery equilibrium and thus has a lower negative effect on the
growth rate.
3.2 Interior asymmetric equilibria
As already mentioned, deriving analytical expressions for all steady states
is too cumbersome. It is, however, possible to reduce the system of three
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Figure 2: Steady-state values of θK as a function of µ
equilibrium equations in three variables, i.e. E˙ = E˙∗ = ˙θK = 0, to one
equation in θK , whose roots represent all long-run equilibria. Numerically
investigating this equation reveals that for a small range of mortality rates,
in particular as soon as the threshold value µcp is passed, the core-periphery
equilibria turn into interior asymmetric equilibria. The following figure 2
illustrates these equilibrium characteristics by plotting the steady states of
the system as a function of µ.24 It clearly indicates that there exist, at least
for a small range of mortality rates, interior equilibria with an unequal dis-
tribution of capital across regions which are symmetric around the persistent
steady state θK = 0.5. Similar to Baldwin et al. (2001), figure 2 is highly
reminiscent of a pitchfork bifurcation. The following section will provide
additional evidence for the existence of a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation
by illustrating that the symmetric equilibrium loses its stability as soon as
the two interior asymmetric equilibria appear.
24Note that for the parameter values used, i.e. ρ = 0.015, ξ = 0.3, σ = 4, L = 1, η = 0.5
and φ = 0.9, µcp = 0.285455.
19
4 The joint effect of demography and spillovers on
agglomeration
Figure 2 shows the existence of long-run equilibria that are characterized
by an unequal distribution of capital. Whether such an agglomeration of
economic activity takes place crucially depends on the stability properties of
the symmetric equilibrium. If it turns out that this steady state is unstable,
any slight perturbation of the symmetric outcome triggers agglomeration
processes that might result in either the asymmetric interior or the core-
periphery equilibria.
In general, NEG models focus on the role of changing trade costs for the
emergence of spatial structures, i.e. they show how economic integration
lowering the costs of trading goods leads to concentration of economic ac-
tivity. Other features of the economy could, however, be similarly decisive
for agglomeration processes. Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009)
have shown that the adoption of an overlapping generation structure with
lifetime uncertainty, i.e. increasing µ above zero, considerably reduces the
possibility of the symmetric equilibrium to be unstable in the constructed
capital framework of Baldwin (1999). The main question to be investigated
in this section is whether an analogous finding also holds in a setting with
endogenous growth due to learning spillovers. In particular, it is of inter-
est how demographic structures interact with the additional growth-linked
circular causality resulting from the incorporation of knowledge spillovers
in the investment sector. Finally, it is worth investigating the role of life-
time uncertainty in the selection among the asymmetric equilibria, i.e. how
it influences the importance of initial conditions relative to expectations in
choosing the region where agglomeration takes place.
4.1 Formal stability analysis
The stability properties of the symmetric long-run equilibrium are analyzed
by following the classical approach (see e.g. the appendix on mathematical
methods in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)) of linearizing the non-linear
dynamic system (18), (19) and (20)25 around the symmetric equilibrium
and then by evaluating the eigenvalues of the corresponding 3× 3 Jacobian
25Equations (18) and (19) were multiplied by E or E∗ to obtain E˙ and E˙∗.
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matrix  j11 j12 j13j12 j11 −j13
j31 −j31 j33,
 (27)
whose entries are given in appendix A. Solving the characteristic equation
yields the following three eigenvalues
eig1 =
√
L2(η + 1)2 + 2Lρ(η + 1) + (2µ+ ρ)2, (28)
eig2 =
1
2(η + 1)(φ+ 1)2σ
(r −
√
rad), (29)
eig3 =
1
2(η + 1)(φ+ 1)2σ
(r +
√
rad), (30)
where
r ≡ (−2Lη + eig1)((η + 1)(φ+ 1)2σ)− 2φ(ηφ− 1)Qξ,
rad ≡ (((η − 1)eig1 + 2ηρ)σ(φ+ 1)2 + 2(φ− η)Qξ)2
−8η(η + 1)(φ+ 1)3σ((φ+ 1)σ + (φ− 1)ξ)×
×
Q
(
−Lη2 + L+ 12Q
(
η − 2(ηφ
2−2φ+η)ξ
(φ+1)2σ − 1
))
2(η + 1)
− µ(µ+ ρ)
 ,
with the parameter cluster Q ≡ L(η + 1) + eig1 + ρ. The signs and nature
of these eigenvalues fully characterize the system’s local dynamics around
the symmetric equilibrium. Since there are two jump variables E and E∗,
stability requires at least one eigenvalue to be negative. In particular, saddle
path stability prevails if one out of the three eigenvalues is negative.
First it is easily established that eigenvalue 1 is always real and positive
for all possible parameter values.26 As far as the remaining two eigenvalues
are concerned things turn out to be more complicated. Checking rad for
various parameter specifications shows that it changes sign, i.e. one must
differentiate between the case where eigenvalues 2 and 3 are real and the
case where they are complex. In both cases stability properties crucially
depend on the sign of r. Since (−2Lη + eig1) > 0 and (ηφ − 1) ≤ 0 r is
unambiguously positive for all possible parameter ranges.
26Recall the parameter ranges σ > 1, ρ > 0, µ > 0, 0 < ξ < 1 and 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ η ≤ 1
and L > 0 which also imply that Q > 0.
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4.2 The case of real eigenvalues - The opposing stability ef-
fects of demography and spillovers
With real eigenvalues, r > 0 immediately implies that eigenvalue 3 is also
positive resulting in lemma 1.
Lemma 1. For the case of real eigenvalues, i.e. rad > 0, eigenvalue 2 is
decisive for the local stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium. A
positive eigenvalue 2 implies instability, a negative one saddle path stability.
Proof. See above arguing.
Lemma 1 implies that changes in the mortality rate can only influence
the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium via eigenvalue 2. Nu-
merically investigating this eigenvalue immediately results in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. The possibility of agglomeration crucially hinges on the
mortality rate.
Proof. Figure 327, which plots eigenvalue 2 as a function of the mortality
rate for an intermediate level of interregional spillovers η = 0.5 and for
three different levels of economic integration, clearly reveals that eigenvalue
2 switches sign depending on the mortality rate.
Proposition 4 verifies the crucial importance of demographic structures
for agglomeration processes found by Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner
(2009) also for a setting that additionally allows for endogenous growth due
to learning spillovers. Figure 3, however, does not only show this decisive
role of the mortality rate but also reconfirms the stabilizing effect of intro-
ducing overlapping generations and lifetime uncertainty. Consistent with
Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009), eigenvalue 2 decreases in the
mortality rate, i.e. only for sufficiently low mortality rates agglomeration
processes may set in. In their framework without knowledge spillovers, this
stabilizing effect even implied that for plausible parameter values instability
could never occur. In particular, they showed that for mortality rates cor-
responding to life expectancies of less than approximately 3500 years28 the
27Figure 3 is again plotted for ρ = 0.015, ξ = 0.3, σ = 4 and L = 1.
28Since the probability of death during each year equals µ, average life expectancy is 1
µ
.
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Figure 3: Eigenvalue 2 as a function of µ
symmetric equilibrium was stable for all levels of economic integration.29
This is in sharp contrast to the present setting with endogenous growth due
to learning effects. Indeed, figure 3 clearly indicates that agglomeration is
still a fully possible outcome. It shows that for a rather low level of trade
openness φ = 0.3, the critical mortality rate µbreak below which eigenvalue
2 is positive and thus the symmetric equilibrium unstable30 is 0.109. This
corresponds to a life expectancy of only 9 years, which illustrates that, in
contrast to Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009), a plausible choice of
parameter values does not eliminate the possibility of agglomeration of eco-
nomic activity even though we allow for nonzero mortality rates. Summariz-
ing, the findings so far imply that, although the introduction of overlapping
generations still acts as a dispersion force in a NEG model with endogenous
growth, its impacts are, in general, not strong enough to prevent regions
from unequal development.
The intuition for this result is simple. It is based on the existence of two
countervailing effects which would not be present in a setting without learn-
29This holds for their most plausible choice of parameter values, i.e. ρ = 0.015, δ = 0.05,
ξ = 0.3 and σ = 4. Setting δ = 0 as in this setting only insignificantly reduces this life
expectancy threshold value.
30The analytical expression for µbreak is too unwieldy to report. The Mathematica file
deriving it is available upon request.
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ing spillovers and ignoring demographic structures. In particular, whether
agglomeration takes place in this model economy depends on the relative
strength of four distinct agglomeration or dispersion forces. Each of them
captures how an exogenous increase of the capital share impacts upon the
rate of capital accumulation. If it raises it, agglomeration of capital takes
place since a circular causality sets in. Otherwise, the decreased capital ac-
cumulation rate acts as a self-correcting force promoting dispersion rather
than concentration of economic activity.
First, there are two forces that are neither linked to the demographic
structure nor to the spillover specification. These are the standard anti-
agglomerative local competition effect and the pro-agglomerative demand-
linked circular causality first introduced by Baldwin (1999). The latter
shows that a higher share of capital in one region increases expenditures
and thus operating profits, i.e. capital rental rates, which speeds up capital
accumulation. The former, on the other hand, captures the negative impact
of agglomeration of capital, i.e. firms, on capital rental rates due to more
severe competition. Both of these forces are, however, not the channels via
which the mortality rate on the one hand and learning spillovers on the other
hand impact upon the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium.
The particular channel via which demography influences agglomeration
processes has first been identified by Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner
(2009) as the anti-agglomerative turnover effect. An exogenous rise in the
home capital share increases wealth and thus expenditure levels of indi-
viduals being currently alive in the home region relative to foreign-based
individuals. The negative distributional effects on aggregate expenditures
resulting from death, i.e. the replacement of these individuals by newborns
whose consumption expenditures are lower since they have zero wealth lev-
els, are thus more pronounced in the home region. This, in turn, decreases
the home expenditure share and therefore relative profitability and the rel-
ative capital rental rate.
Finally, the impact of learning spillovers on the stability properties of the
symmetric equilibrium are captured by the growth-linked circular causality
introduced by Martin and Ottaviano (1999). If learning spillovers are local-
ized, a higher share of capital in the home region lowers the marginal cost
of producing new capital relative to the foreign region (see equation 1) and
thus strengthens capital accumulation. Endogenous growth is thus a power-
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Figure 4: Symmetric equilibrium stability map
ful destabilizing force that mitigates the stabilizing effect of the turnover of
generations. The strength of this growth-linked circular causality crucially
depends on the degree of localization of spillovers. As can be seen in figure
431, which plots the zero level curve of eigenvalue 2, i.e. the dividing line
between stability and instability, for three different levels of trade openness,
agglomeration is fostered the more learning externalities are localized. In
particular, with no learning spillovers across regions, i.e. η = 0, eigenvalue
2 is positive for all possible parameter ranges and the system is always un-
stable. Figure 4, however, also illustrates the stabilizing effect of increased
interregional spillovers. For a given mortality rate of e.g. 0.0125 result-
ing in a life expectancy of 80 years and intermediate trade openness levels
φ = 0.5, fostering interregional knowledge spillovers above a level of about
0.8 could still prevent regions from unequal development. The strength of
this stabilizing effect of knowledge spillovers becomes clear if one considers
the case of globalized learning effects, i.e. η = 1. In this case the symmetric
equilibrium is stable for all levels of trade costs as long as individuals face a
life expectancy of less than approximately 3600 years, i.e. as in Grafeneder-
31Figure 4 is again plotted for ρ = 0.015, ξ = 0.3, σ = 4 and L = 1.
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Weissteiner and Prettner (2009) agglomeration of economic activity does
not occur for plausible parameter values.
Last but not least, the stability findings of this section also provide addi-
tional evidence that the dynamic system undergoes a supercritical pitchfork
bifurcation as the mortality rate crosses a certain threshold value. In partic-
ular, for the parameter values of figure 2, the critical mortality rate µbreak
at which the symmetric equilibrium loses stability is 0.313. As can be seen
from figure 2, this value exactly coincides with the threshold mortality rate
where the two interior asymmetric steady states, that finally turn into the
core-periphery equilibria, show up. Following Baldwin (2001), one can thus
conclude that as soon as the mortality rate crosses µbreak from above, the
symmetric steady state loses its stability to the two appearing neighboring
asymmetric interior steady states. The question which out of these two
equilibria will then be reached, i.e. in which region agglomeration will take
place, is briefly addressed in the next subsection.
4.3 The case of complex eigenvalues - Lifetime uncertainty
and the history-versus-expectations debate
The analysis so far has shown that nonzero mortality rates foster a more
equal distribution of economic activity due to the turnover of generations.
With complex eigenvalues, i.e. rad < 0, the symmetric equilibrium is, how-
ever, always unstable since r is unambiguously positive for all possible pa-
rameter ranges. As will become clear, the mortality rate nonetheless plays
a decisive role for the dynamics of the system by influencing the dividing
line between the case of monotone divergence, that occurs for a positive real
eigenvalue 2, and the case of diverging oscillations resulting from complex
eigenvalues.
Krugman (1991a)32 shows that in the first situation history, represented
by initial conditions, is the crucial factor with respect to equilibrium selec-
tion, whereas in the latter self-fulfilling expectations might also be decisive.
In particular, as long as all eigenvalues are real, agglomeration of capital will
take place in the region with the initially larger share of capital. In the case
of complex eigenvalues, on the other hand, equilibrium paths overlap such
that there exists a range around the symmetric equilibrium, where a given
32Baldwin (2001) gives a nice overview over the history-versus-expectations debate in
NEG models initiated by Krugman (1991a).
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initial distribution of capital corresponds to paths each leading to agglomer-
ation in a different region and expectations determine which path is chosen.
Since the parameters of the model determine whether there are complex or
real eigenvalues it is perfectly possible to investigate the role of the mortality
rate with respect to such history-versus-expectations considerations.
According to Baldwin (2001), a sufficient condition for there to be some
overlap of saddle paths is that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian evaluated at
the unstable equilibrium are complex, i.e. rad < 0. Checking the depen-
dence of rad on µ reveals that lifetime uncertainty strengthens the role of
initial conditions in choosing among the multiple long-run equilibria. This
is summarized in proposition 5.
Proposition 5. The possibility of self-fulfilling expectations rather than ini-
tial conditions being decisive for equilibrium selection arises only for suffi-
ciently low mortality rates.
Proof. Using Mathematica it can be shown that ∂rad∂µ ≥ 0 for all possible
parameter ranges.33
Intuitively, a higher mortality rate implies that individuals discount the
future more heavily. This impatience means that they do not care too much
about expected profitability of capital accumulation which itself depends on
the future investment decisions of other individuals (recall that a region’s
relative attractiveness with respect to capital accumulation depends on its
capital share). But this is exactly one main reason why expectations could
be important. If everyone expects that investment will mainly take place
in the home region, then this increases the attractiveness of also investing
there independently of the current situation, i.e. independent of the relative
investment profitability in the initial condition. With low patience such
considerations about future investment returns lose, however, importance
and it is rather the current relative returns that are decisive.
Finally, numerically investigating the parameter region within which
rad < 034 more thoroughly reveals that the possibility of expectations to be
decisive for equilibrium selection in our model is, in general, rather low. For
33 ∂rad
∂µ
is too cumbersome to be revealing. The calculations are available upon request.
34Note that the threshold value µreal, obtained from setting rad = 0, below which there
are complex eigenvalues, is lower than µbreak, obtained from setting eigenvalue 2 equal to
zero, i.e. r =
√
rad, since r > 0 and rad has been shown to increase in µ.
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Figure 5: The subordinate role of expectations relative to initial conditions
for equilibrium selection
the parameter values of figure 2 e.g., the eigenvalues are real for all levels
of the mortality rate. Figure 5, which replicates, for varying mortality rates
and spillovers, the dividing line between stability and instability of figure 4
and additionally shows the level curve where rad = 0, i.e. the dividing line
between monotone divergence and diverging oscillations, indicates a sim-
ilar conclusion. The area inside the instability region featuring diverging
oscillations instead of monotonic divergence is relatively small. This again
emphasizes the subordinate role of expectations in answering the question
in which region agglomeration will take place.
5 Concluding remarks
By incorporating an overlapping generation structure and lifetime uncer-
tainty into a NEG model that features endogenous growth through learning
externalities, this paper has shed further light on whether and how demo-
graphic structures impact upon the spatial distribution of economic activity.
In doing so, it moreover gives deeper insights on how lifetime uncertainty af-
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fects the long-run equilibrium growth perspectives of the symmetric relative
to the core-periphery outcome.
The main results are twofold. First, consistent with the findings in
Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009), nonzero mortality rates result-
ing in age-dependent heterogeneity of individuals support a more equal dis-
tribution of productive factors by introducing an additional dispersion force
that countervails the agglomeration tendencies resulting from endogenous
growth through knowledge spillovers. In particular, if interregional knowl-
edge spillovers are sufficiently encouraged across regions, the turnover of
generations can even prevent regions from unequal development. Moreover,
the possibility of agglomeration being the result of a self-fulfilling prophecy
is substantially reduced when considering individuals who face a positive
probability of death. Second, lifetime uncertainty lowers both the symmet-
ric equilibrium’s as well as the core-periphery outcome’s growth rate. As
long as learning spillovers are not purely localized, this decrease is, however,
more pronounced for the latter one. Thus, in sharp contrast to existing NEG
growth models with localized knowledge spillovers, spatial concentration of
economic activity is not necessarily conducive to growth if one takes into
account demographic structures. This also implies that there might not be
any trade-off between fostering an equal distribution of productive factors
and high economic growth which would result from e.g. increased economic
integration if agglomeration were unambiguously pro-growth.
Due to analytical tractability, the present framework still draws a very
simplified picture of reality. The model could, however, be easily extended to
investigate further relevant issues related to the interaction between agglom-
eration, growth and demography. What happens if regions are asymmetric
with respect to mortality rates or the degree of interregional spillovers?
What are the exact welfare implications of the results obtained so far? What
are the main differences, in particular with respect to growth rates, between
partial and full agglomeration equilibria, i.e. between the interior asym-
metric and the core-periphery steady states? These are only few questions
that could still be investigated more thoroughly within the model framework
developed in this paper.
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Appendix
A Intermediate results for the stability analysis
The Jacobian matrix given in equation (27) has the following entries
J11 = −ηL− L− ρ+
(ηL+ L+ ρ+ eig1)
(
η + ηξ−ηφξ
φσ+σ
+ 2
)
2(η + 1)
,
J12 =
η (ηL+ L+ ρ+ eig1)
(
(φ−1)ξ
(φ+1)σ
+ 1
)
2(η + 1)
,
J13 =
4η
 (ηL+L+ρ+eig1)
(
−Lη2+L+ 12 (ηL+L+ρ+eig1)
(
η− 2(ηφ
2−2φ+η)ξ
(φ+1)2σ
−1
))
2(η+1)
− µ(µ+ ρ)

(η + 1)2
,
J31 = − (η + 1)((φ+ 1)σ + (φ− 1)ξ)
4(φ+ 1)σ
,
J33 =
(ηL+ L+ ρ+ eig1)
(
η − (ηφ
2−2φ+η)ξ
(φ+1)2σ
)
η + 1
− 2Lη,
where eig1 =
√
L2(η + 1)2 + 2Lρ(η + 1) + (2µ+ ρ)2.
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